
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                
14	The	methodology,	suggest	by	van	Leeuwen,	and	endorsed	by	me	here,	of	categorizing	and	redefining	
putative	‘beliefs’	based	on	their	function	might	also	be	a	productive	way	of	pursuing	one	form	of	
eliminative	materialism	in	the	philosophy	of	mind	(Churchland,	1981;	Stich	1983;	Churchland,	1986).	
Thus,	what	van	Leeuwen	calls	a	‘factual	belief’	and	I	call	a	‘predictive	belief’	might	be	better	understood	as	
a	‘predictive	attitude’,	in	that	rather	than	believing	something,	one	takes	a	predictive	attitude	toward	the	
content	of	a	proposition.		
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cooperation	within	one’s	in-group	is	a	purpose	‘chosen’	by	evolution	that	leads	to	the	
population	of	one’s	web	of	belief	with	beliefs	that	is	not	there	by	virtue	of	their	role	in	
prediction.	If	so,	then	the	work	of	Johnson	and	Berring	(2009)	on	the	‘supernatural	
punishment	theory’	as	an	evolutionary	adaptation	goes	some	way	to	explain	the	
presence	of	religious	beliefs.	
	
Undoubtedly,	predicting	future	experience	in	the	light	of	past	experience	is	interestingly	
related	to	furthering	cooperation	within	one’s	in-group,	but	these	are	distinct	purposes	
that	lead	to	the	endorsement	of	a	range	of	interestingly	related	beliefs.	And	thus,	one	
can	endorse	beliefs	within	the	web	of	belief	that	are	not	there	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	
they	help	us	predict	future	experience,	but	rather	they	are	there	because	they	further	
our	wider	interests	and	purposes,	such	as	furthering	cooperation	within	one’s	in-group.		
	
In	a	related	debate,	the	feminist	critique	of	epistemology	and	philosophy	of	science	
suggests	that	more	interests	and	purposes	are	at	play	in	human	intellectual	inquiry	than	
are	explicitly	acknowledged.	So,	using	the	feminist	critique	we	have	examined,	we	can	
now	consider	what	biases	(as	they	would	call	them)	are	in	play	in	an	individual’s	web	of	
belief.	And	it	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	feminist	critique	does	not	advocate	any	
attempt	to	remove	the	biases	from	our	epistemic	processes.	The	feminist	critique	
suggests	that	all	human	epistemic	processes	are	biased,	and	so	they	advocate,	not	the	
removal	of	bias,	but	an	acknowledgment	of	bias	and	then	an	open	and	honest	discussion	
concerning	the	role	that	bias	plays	in	epistemic	inquiry.		
	
Thus,	in	conclusion,	I	suggest	that	the	insights	of	Quine	within	the	larger	project	of	
naturalised	epistemology	and	the	feminist	critiques	of	both	epistemology	and	the	
philosophy	of	science	are	relevant	to	religious	epistemology.	If	one	understands	that	the	
interests	and	purposes	served	by	one’s	epistemic	endeavours	(whether	chosen	
consciously	or	not)	are	wider	than	simply	predicting	future	experience,	then	there	may	
be	a	place	for	religious	belief	within	one’s	web	of	belief.	My	purpose	here	is	not	to	list	a	
set	of	theoretical	(or	evolutionary)	virtues	that	would	be	appropriate	for	a	web	of	belief	
understood	in	the	context	of	a	broader	set	of	interests	and	purposes.	My	purpose	is	
simply	to	make	the	point	that,	just	as	feminists	have	critiqued	science	and	made	explicit	
the	biases	that	they	claim	already	exist	in	supposedly	‘impartial’	systems	of	theory	
construction,	people	who	hold	a	religious	perspective	could	do	the	same.	All	systems	of	
theory	construction	are	biased	in	some	way.	Thus,	following	the	lead	of	the	feminist	
critique,	I	suggest	the	way	forward	is	to	acknowledge	the	bias	and	then	have	an	open	
and	honest	discussion.	A	discussion	that	will	hopefully	lead	to	a	greater	understanding	
of	the	various	epistemic	perspectives	generated	by	our	differing	interests	and	purposes.	
And	such	a	discussion	may	go	some	way	toward	answering	the	question:	Do	religious	
beliefs	have	a	place	within	an	‘epistemically	naturalized’	cognitive	system?	
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